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  Structural changes in the U.S. dairy industry from the early 1980s to 
the late 1990s included familiar increases in concentration, industry 
adjustments to serve large supermarkets, the emergence of two national fluid 
milk firms (Suiza Foods and Dean Foods), and the emergence of two 
national dairy cooperatives (Dairy Farmers of America and Land O'Lakes, 
Inc.).  Shifts in the location of milk production in the U.S. to the Western 
states have caused new dairy product manufacturing plants to locate in those 
states.  This development promises to intensify battles over market share in 
the expanding U.S. cheese market between Western firms and Upper 
Midwestern firms.  Foreign direct investment in the U.S. dairy industry--
especially by European Union firms and a large Canadian firm--increased 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  Facing challenges to expand dairy exports or 
shrink, the U.S. dairy industry probably will gravitate toward the latter 
unless government price support and trade policies change to increase price 




  This paper analyzes structural changes in the U.S. dairy industry from 
the early 1980s to the late 1990s. Structural change, as used in the paper, 
refers to changes in the size, number, and location of firms, changes in firms' 
market shares, changes in organizational arrangements used by firms, and 
changes in the competitive strategies of firms. The paper begins with capsule 
descriptions of the structure of the U.S. dairy industry in the early 1980s and 
the late 1990s.  Second, statistics are presented on changes in the size,   
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 number, market shares, and concentration ratios for U.S. dairy firms--
emphasizing cooperatives--from the early 1980s to the late 1990s. Finally, 
drivers of structural changes in the U.S. dairy industry are discussed.  The 
important drivers include (a) forces that have produced industry 
concentration in milk processing and distribution--mainly developments 
causing processors to seek economies of scale in processing, capitalize on 
economies associated with extended shelf life products, and gear up to serve 
large supermarkets effectively, (b) economic forces that have caused an 
increasing proportion of U.S. milk production and processing to shift to the 
Western U.S., and (c) international market forces and institutions that have 
limited U.S. dairy product imports and exports and expanded foreign direct 
investment in the U.S. dairy industry.  As will be apparent, the structure of 
the U.S. dairy industry changed in mostly an evolutionary fashion from the 
early 1980s to the late 1990s but the structure of the late 1990s has been 
influenced by strategic moves by a few firms.  Those firms making dramatic 
strategic moves included Suiza Foods, Dean Foods, Dairy Farmers of 
America (DFA), Land O' Lakes, Inc., and the Saputo Group Inc.   
 
The U.S. Dairy Industry in the Early 1980s 
 
  In many ways, the structure of the U.S. dairy industry in the early 
1980s was similar to that which exists today.  Partly because of the 
pervasive impacts of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) dairy 
price support program in the early 1980s, the market environment was less 
risky and posed fewer challenges for U.S. milk processors then. Prices 
processors paid for manufacturing milk were more stable in the early 1980s 
in part because U.S. manufacturing milk prices rested on USDA dairy price 
supports throughout much of the 1980s until about 1989. Prices processors 
paid for fluid milk reflected this stability since, under federal milk orders 
and cooperative bargaining arrangements, fluid milk prices were determined 
by adding fixed fluid differentials to manufacturing milk prices.  Dairy 
imports posed few threats to the domestic industry because quotas limited 
imports of most dairy products.  Casein represented an exception. Imports of 
this product were not limited by quotas and carried a zero tariff. 
  In the early 1980s, strong upward trends in the use of milk for cheese 
production had been in evidence for at least 15 years.  Downtrends in 
consumption of full-fat whole milk also were well established. 
Following long established trends, concentration of milk processing 
continued in the early 1980s.  Borden and Dean Foods--the No. 1 and No. 2 
fluid milk processors in the country--engaged in new product development and other product differentiation measures, and were busily buying regional 
dairies to acquire strong regional brands and to obtain scale economies in 
processing and distribution [10]. Other fluid milk processors mimiced these 
measures, entered into joint ventures, and pursued a host of other strategies 
to reduce marketing and processing costs. Processors continued to construct 
large butter and cheese processing plants in the Western U.S. at limited risk 
to themselves because minimum prices for output from these plants were 
guaranteed by the USDA's dairy price support program.  In addition, 
California manufacturing milk processors received guaranteed processing 
margins under that state's milk stabilization program.    
  Mergers of U.S. dairy cooperatives slowed during the 1980s.  While 
fringe cooperatives continued to join larger dairy cooperatives, there were no 
mergers of the size that formed the large cooperatives such as Associated 
Milk Producers, Inc., Mid-America Dairymen, and Dairymen, Inc. during 
the late 1960s and 1970s.  Moreover, fragmentation of dairy cooperatives in 
the Southeastern U.S., in particular, increased during the 1980s.  These 
developments increased incentives for cooperative mergers to reduce 
fragmentation and countervail the market power gained by investor-owned 
processors and supermarkets during the late 1990s.   
 
The U.S. Dairy Industry in the Late 1990s 
 
  Those familiar with the U.S. dairy industry in the early 1980s would 
easily recognize the industry that had evolved by the late 1990s.  However, 
the increased volatility of milk prices in the late 1990s introduced more price 
risk into milk production and dairy processing.  Concentration in milk 
processing and asset redeployment continued during the late 1990s, as a few 
large firms recorded the most noteworthy changes.  Among the noteworthy 
changes was Borden's exit from the U.S. dairy business. 
  U.S. manufacturing milk prices generally remained above the USDA's 
price support levels during the late 1990s and became more variable, 
injecting additional risk into milk buying and dairy product inventory 
management.  The price volatility emerged partly because the government 
support level had been reduced by about 25% from levels existing in the 
early 1980s and supply-demand balances in U.S. dairy markets tightened.  In 
the late 1990s, nonfat dry milk--for which a structural surplus exists in the 
U.S.--was the only product purchased in volume under the USDA's dairy 
price support program.  Portions of this structural surplus were exported 
with subsidies under the USDA's Dairy Export Incentive Program(DEIP). To combat the increased price risk, futures markets and options for 
milk and dairy products were introduced. 
While there were a few changes, long-standing increases in per capita 
cheese consumption and the decline in consumption of certain other dairy 
products--especially fluid whole milk--continued.  Changes that may have 
impacts in the 2000s include a slower rate of increase in cheese 
consumption.  While the Uruguay Round GATT/WTO agreement increased 
access to the U.S. cheese market, dairy imports and exports continued to be 
small.  The New Zealand Dairy Board supplied much of the additional 
cheese that entered the U.S. as a result of the Uruguay Round trade 
agreement [11].    
  The Borden Company and Suiza Foods contributed mightily to 
restructuring and redeploying assets in the fluid milk industry.  Borden 
began selling fluid milk plants located in the Midwestern U.S. and Southern 
U.S. in 1989 in regions where competition was particularly strong and 
Borden's share of the fluid milk market was low.  The firm continued to 
divest itself of U.S. fluid milk plants in subsequent years and in 1997 sold 
the last of its dairy businesses (Borden/Meadow Gold Dairies) to Mid-
America Dairymen, a farmer cooperative located in Springfield, Missouri 
[5]. Mid-America Dairymen determined that Southern Foods Group, a 
company in which the cooperative held 50% ownership, would handle the 
transaction and manage the dairies.  Borden also exited from the cheese 
business.  
  Founded in 1989, Suiza Foods emerged during the period when 
Borden was exiting from the U.S. dairy business [16].  Suiza began with a 
single Puerto Rican dairy in 1993.  Following a string of 20 major fluid milk 
company acquisitions in the 1990s, Suiza's annual sales grew to U.S.$4.5 
billion in 1999 while penetrating fluid milk markets in 46 states stretching 
from Florida to California [4].  The largest of the acquisitions was the 1999 
purchase of the Southern Foods Group whose brands included Borden, 
Meadowgold and Schepps.  Suiza acquired the Southern Foods Group from 
Dairy Farmers of America (DFA) under an alliance arrangement whereby 
DFA will supply raw milk to the Southern Foods Group plants.  The 
acquisition of the Southern Foods Group pushed Suiza's share of the U.S. 
fluid milk market to about 18% in 1999 [34].      
Dean Foods, which was the second largest fluid milk processor in the 
U.S. during much of the 1980s and which moved into first place after 
Borden exited from the industry, again found itself in the second position--
this time to Suiza--in the late 1990s.  Like Suiza, Dean Foods went on an 
acquisition spree in the 1990s, acquiring 14 fluid milk companies in 1997 and 1998 [13]. The acquisitions pushed Dean's sales to U.S.$3.8 billion in 
1999, up from U.S.$2.7 billion in 1998 [8,9].  The company's fluid milk 
plants are concentrated in the Midwest, South Central states, and California.    
Mid-America Dairymen, a cooperative representing about 12,600 
farmers in 30 states, merged with three other cooperatives to form DFA on 
January 1, 1998.  In addition to Mid-America Dairymen, the DFA 
cooperative included Milk Marketing, Inc. (Ohio), Western Dairymen 
Cooperative, Inc. (Colorado), and the Southern Region of Associated Milk 
Producers, Inc. (Texas).  DFA represented 22,000 milk producers in 42 
states and controlled about 21% of the U.S. milk supply [25].  
  Headquartered since its founding in Minnesota in the Upper 
Midwestern U.S., Land O' Lakes, Inc. became a national dairy cooperative 
in 1998 when it merged with Dairymen's Cooperative Creamery Association 
in Tulare, California [19].  The California merger came on the heels of the 
firm's merger with Atlantic Dairy Cooperative of Pennsylvania a year 
earlier. The California merger positioned the firm to take advantage of the 
rapidly increasing milk supplies in this Western State.  This was important 
because milk supplies in many parts of the Upper Midwestern U.S. were flat 
or declining.  The two mergers increased Land O' Lakes' milk supply from 
four billion pounds per year to about 12 billion pounds per year.  
Aided by its famous butter brand, Land O' Lakes had about a 31% 
market share in the U.S. retail butter market in 1999 and has expanded that 
figure by recent acquisitions.  Previously primarily a buyer of butter from 
other firms, the cooperative has expanded control over the U.S. butter supply 
to about the same percentage as its share of the retail butter market. The firm 
also is in the fluid milk and farm input supply businesses.  
  The Saputo Group of Canada acquired Stella Foods, Inc. of 
Lincolnshire, Illinois in 1997 for U.S.$ 405 million [6]. Stella Foods was the 
fifth largest U.S. cheese company prior to the acquisition. With the 
acquisition of Stella, the Saputo Group, one of Canada's largest cheese firms, 
tripled its revenues to about U.S.$1.1 billion per year and placed three-
quarters of the Group's sales in the U.S.  It also acquired Stella's well known 
cheese brands, including Stella, Frigo, Lorraine, Dragone, and Gardenia. 
More on the Saputo Group later. 
  
Changes in Size, Number, Market Share, and Concentration Ratios for  
U.S. Dairy Firms 
 
  Data for the U.S. dairy industry relating to firm size, firm numbers, 
market shares, and concentration ratios for dairy cooperatives and propriety firms for the early 1980s through 1997 appear in this section.  Aggregate 
figures on U.S. dairy cooperatives are presented first followed by figures for 
processors of fluid milk, cheese, butter and milk powder.  Information on 
U.S. dairy cooperatives was obtained from widely used periodic surveys of 
all U.S. dairy cooperatives conducted by the USDA's Rural Business 
Cooperative Service [20,21,22].  
 
Changes in the Size and Nature of U.S. Dairy Cooperatives 
   While there was a 48% decline in the number of U.S. dairy 
cooperatives during 1980 to 1997, the numbers remained relatively large in 
the latter year.  The large number of cooperatives in the 1990s reflects, 
among other things, the presence of numerous small cheese manufacturing 
cooperatives and many small milk assembly cooperatives.   
 
Table 1. Figures describing U.S. Dairy Cooperatives for Selected Years,    
              1980-97.     
_____________________________________________________________ 
 Item      1980   1987   1992   1997 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Number of Dairy  
Cooperatives        435     296     265     226 
 
Number of Farmer  
Members         163,549       120,603       110,440        87,938    
 
Farm Milk Marketed 
by Cooperatives  
(1,000 mt.)                      43,356         47,982         55,601        57,778 
 
Cooperative Share of  
All Farm Milk Marketed          77%    76%            82%             83% 
 
Farm Milk Marketed by the  
--Largest 4 Cooperatives          26%            25%          25%          29% 
--Largest 8 Cooperatives          36%            35%          36%              42%  
--Largest 20 Cooperatives        52%               56%           58%             65% 
_____________________________________________________________   
*Source:  Ling, K.C. and C. Betts-Liebrand [20], Ling, K.C. and J.B. Roof,  
[21]; and Ling, K. C. [22]. The share of all milk U.S. marketed by dairy cooperatives increased 
from 1980 to 1997. It is difficult to assess unambiguously what this figure 
means since U.S. dairy cooperatives perform different functions.  Some are 
simply the bargaining agent for milk channeled to propriety processors. 
Others process butter, cheese and other dairy products into bulk lots for sale 
to propriety handlers for further processing.  Still others process and market 
finished dairy products.  The value added by the bargaining agents, the 
producers of bulk dairy products, and the processor-distributors differ 
substantially but no information on this point is provided by the figures.  
As expected in a period of increasing cooperative concentration, the 
percentage of cooperatives that processed and marketed most dairy products 
declined from 1992-97.  Ling reports that the percentage of cooperatives 
marketing butter declined most (47%) during 1992-97 [22].  A larger 
percentage of cooperatives adhered to manufacturing and marketing dried 
whey products and nonfat dry milk--there was only a 6% and 8% reduction, 
respectively, in the number of cooperatives marketing these products from 
1992-97.  
Lastly, the four firm concentration ratio for milk marketed by U.S. 
dairy cooperatives recorded a limited increase from the early 1980s to the 
late 1990s, reaching 29% in 1997.  This ratio, of course, may have increased 
in 1998 as a result of the formation of DFA and the merger of Land O'Lakes 
with Dairymen's Cooperative Association of California.  The concentration 
ratio showing the largest percentage increase was for the largest 20 
cooperatives which recorded a 13 percentage point increase form 1980 to 
1992, suggesting that some intermediate-sized dairy cooperatives expanded 
business substantially during 1980 to 1997.  
  
Changes in the Structure of Fluid Milk, Cheese, Butter, and Milk 
Powder Processing Industries   
While the figures in Table 2 provide information on general trends in 
processor concentration, production, and value of shipments for fluid milk, 
butter, cheese and milk powder, there are unfortunately gaps in the statistics 
for milk powder.  Those gaps are identified with an "NA" in the table.       
  Fluid Milk Products.  The number of companies processing fluid milk  
declined by nearly 50% from 1982 to 1997.  These figures and the number 
of fluid milk establishments can be expected to show further reductions as 
Suiza Foods and Dean Foods acquire companies and serve retail outlets from 
the most profitable locations. 
  The quantity of milk processed into fluid milk products in the U.S. 
plateaued in the 1990s at about 25 million metric tons.  However, the nominal value of fluid milk products shipped continued to increase from the 
early 1980s to the late 1990s.  In real (deflated) terms, however, there was a 
decline in the value of fluid milk shipments during the 1990s.  
  Cooperatives have for decades processed a relatively small percentage 
of the fluid milk sold in the U.S.  This pattern remains evident in the figures 
in Table 2.  While Prairie Farms Cooperative (Illinois) represents a 
prominent exception, most U.S. cooperatives have not found fluid milk 
processing to be profitable. Accordingly, large cooperatives such as DFA 
make extensive use of joint ventures under which the cooperative supplies 
the raw milk, but proprietary handlers do most of the processing.   
  Cheese Production.  Familiar trends appear in Table 2 for cheese.  
The number of companies producing cheese declined by about 30% from 
1982 to 1997 in the U.S.  The amount of cheese produced increased by 61% 
from 1982 to 1997 while the value of shipments recorded nearly a 90% 
increase during this period.  The cooperative's share of cheese production 
declined from 1980 to 1997.  Propriety firms such as Kraft, Leprino, and 
Saputo were strong bidders for milk destined for processing into the 
increasingly popular and sometimes highly differentiated cheese products.  
  Butter Production.  While the decline began from a smaller base, the 
reduction in number of U.S. butter companies (-48%) from 1982 to 1997 
was similar to that for fluid milk (Table 2).  The smallness of the figures for 
number of companies and number of establishments reflect the economies of 
scale in continuous process butter manufacturing.  Unlike the situation for 
production of specialty cheeses, small plants generally are not economically 
viable in butter production.    
 The decline in value of butter shipments reflects mainly the reduction 
in the support price for butter.  However, the uptick in the value of butter 
shipments in 1997 presumably reflects a modest increase in the price of 
butter during the late 1990s, especially for premium butter brands such as 
those marketed by Land O' Lakes, Inc.  
  Cooperatives manufactured about two-thirds of the butter in the U.S. 
during the 1980s and 1990s.   For decades U.S. cooperatives have processed 
butter to use milk which was surplus to fluid milk and cheese making.  
While cooperatives remain dominant in butter making, the firms now 
produce butter mainly from cream that is surplus to fluid milk operations.    
  Milk Powder (Skim Milk Powder and Whole Milk Powder).  In the 
U.S., most milk powder produced is skim milk powder.  For reasons that are 
not clear, the decline in number of milk powder producing establishments 
from 1982 to 1997 was lower than for the other dairy commodities.  There Table 2. Number of Companies, Number of Establishments, Quantity of Product, Value 
              of Shipments, and Share of Product Produced by Cooperatives, Fluid Milk   
              and Manufactured Dairy Products, U.S.,1982-1997.* 
________________________________________________________________________ 




Number of Companies 
  Fluid Milk       854    654         525      435 
  Cheese       575    507         418              398 
  Butter          61      44           31                 32 
  Milk Powder       NA                   NA            NA               NA 
 
Number of Establishments               
  Fluid Milk              1,191              946         746      612 
  Cheese                 704    643         576      524 
  Butter                                        74      49          32        34 
  Milk Powder**      87      79          89                  70 
 
Production of Product  
(1,000 mt.) 
  Fluid Milk                   22,962.4***     24,633.6   25,035.8       24,998.6   
  Cheese            2,059.9            2,423.6       2,942.4  3,324.3 
  Butter                                    570.1                500.7          619.0            522.0 
  Milk Powder**                     681.6                545.6          599.5            607.7 
 
Value of Shipments  
(U.S.$ Billion) 
  Fluid Milk         $ 18.736       $ 20.590  $ 21.927       $ 22.212 
  Cheese            10.763          12.971     18.352          20.326 
  Butter               1.687            1.420          1.034            1.368 
  Milk Powder**           1.496            1.021          1.044            1.543 
 
Share of Product  
Manufactured by  
Cooperatives 
  Fluid Milk             16%***    14%       16%              14% 
  Cheese                                 47%***    45%          43%              40% 
  Butter              64%***    71%          65%              61% 
  Milk Powder**                   87%***    91%          81%              76%  
________________________________________________________________________ 
*Sources: Ling, K.C. and C. Betts-Liebrand [20], Ling, K.C. and  J.B. Roof [21],  
                 Ling, K.C. [22], and U.S. Department of Commerce [38]. 
**Includes skim milk powder and whole milk powder.   
***Data for 1980. also was a modest increase in U.S. milk powder production from 1987 to 
1997, probably reflecting growth of the structural surplus of this product.  
Skim milk powder is to some extent a joint product produced with 
butter. The percentage of milk powder produced by cooperatives declined 
form 1987 to 1997.  In the early 1980s and before, milk powder production 
was a surplus disposal activity--typically handled by cooperatives--for 
dealing with skim milk that was surplus to fluid milk and cheese making.  
The decline in the percentage of milk powder produced by cooperatives may 
reflect increased use of milk powder for cheese making by investor-owned 
firms.       
 
Drivers of Structural Change in the U.S. Dairy Industry 
 
  The drivers of structural change in the U.S. dairy industry are linked 
and, to some extent, similar to those producing structural change in other 
parts of the world.  Probably the driver with the potential to alter the 
structure of the U.S. dairy industry most is the shift of milk production and 
processing to the Western regions of the country.   
 
Forces Producing Concentration in Milk Processing and Distribution         
As noted earlier, the U.S. dairy industry is becoming more 
concentrated both in the fluid milk and manufactured dairy product sectors.   
However, concentration in the U.S.--as reflected in sales figures for the 
largest firms--has not proceeded as far as in Europe.  According to 
Robobank International, the U.S. accounted for only five of the largest 25 
dairy firms in the world in 1998 [30].  Europe dominated the list with only 
the U.S. firms Kraft, DFA, Suiza Foods, Land O' Lakes, and Dean Foods 
appearing on the top 25 list [30].   
Concentration in U.S. Fluid Milk Processing. Pursuit of scale 
economies in processing and distribution and a desire to increase capacity 
utilization underpin many moves toward concentration in U.S. fluid milk 
processing. 
Both Suiza and Dean Foods cite these points as reasons for the 
acquisitions sprees in which both have been involved.  Both firms point out 
that demands of large supermarkets have fostered concentration, noting that 
large retailers are getting more market power and frequently wish to be 
served by only one or two firms.  Smaller dairies, they note, might not be 
able to service big retailers because the feasible service areas of the small 
firms don't extend far enough geographically or the firms don't have the 
capacity to serve the large retailers from their plants [17].   Dean Foods also noted that it was encouraged to accelerate the pace of its acquisitions by 
competition from Suiza for desirable regional firms to acquire.   
Suiza Foods claims that its acquisitions have produced a situation 
where "For the first time in the fluid milk industry, a national company can 
serve retailers that have national operations [34]." Industry analysts have 
concluded that Suiza has advantages in negotiating contracts with larger 
supermarket chains [34].  
C. Nubern, Director of Economic Research for the National Milk 
Producers Federation, pointed out that the top 10 supermarket chains in the 
U.S. now control about 52% of all retail grocery sales, a percentage that has 
nearly doubled since 1987 [14].  The concentration in food retailing in the 
U.S. promises to increase still further because of Wal-Mart's strong 
movement into this retail market segment [31].  Wal-Mart and other large 
retailers often prefer to be served by a few suppliers who deliver in large 
quantities, according to specification, and for prices that smaller milk 
processors would find it difficult to meet.     
  Before the Borden Company exited from the dairy business, the firm  
identified cost economies to be realized from increases in the scale of fluid 
milk processing as follows [1]: 
 
  "Borden engineers have plant designs in hand--using proven  
          equipment and technology--that can process three times as  
  much raw milk as our largest plant today.  Our hyperplant would 
  replace perhaps five or six of our smaller, less efficient dairies. The 
  savings are substantial even with higher costs for transporting milk 
 greater  distances." 
 
  Borden officials also pointed out that they can build large, economic 
plants even for specialty products such as half-and-half, whipping cream, 
and extended shelf life products. 
  Views akin to those expressed by Borden on cost savings available 
from employing large plants for extended shelf life and long shelf life 
products are gaining adherents. More of the so-called micro fluid milk (fluid 
items in pints or quart containers and whipping cream) are being produced 
as extended shelf life items. As markets for extended shelf life products 
expand, this development promises to change fluid milk distribution 
systems, permitting more products to be delivered to supermarkets' 
warehouses in large lots and less frequently than is necessary when limited 
shelf-life products are delivered directly to supermarkets. Warehouse 
delivery of extended shelf life fluid milk products will reduce transportation costs and allow processors to serve supermarkets across wide areas from 
large plants that produce these products. Firms such as Suiza Foods and 
Dean Foods appear to be well positioned to capitalize on the economies 
obtainable from these developments.  As noted later, Parmalot has 
emphasized extended shelf life products in the firm's U.S. operations, 
positioning that firm to expand sales of these items.      
  Borden's financial problems and the firm's decision to exit from the 
dairy business do not invalidate the firm's conclusions about processing 
economies associated with large plants. According to Suiza Foods officials, 
problems with hyperplants were not the force that drove Borden from the 
U.S. dairy business.  Instead, it was Borden's decision to adopt a centralized 
management model that eliminated local control and created conditions that 
increased financial instability [4].  Suiza officials argue that use of the 
centralized model indicated that Borden believed that a thorough knowledge 
of local market conditions was unnecessary for running regional dairy plants 
profitably.  Management practices of both Suiza and Dean Foods suggest 
that these firms believe that the contrary is true.  As evidence of their belief 
in the merits of decentralized operations, Suiza and Dean Foods typically 
leave experienced local managers in place to run fluid milk plants acquired. 
  Industry analysts disagree about how much additional consolidation 
will occur in U.S. fluid milk processing. Some analysts argue that 
consolidation of fluid milk processing has nearly run its course because 
industry leaders already have made most of the potentially profitable 
acquisitions.  The percentage of U.S. fluid milk sales accounted for by Suiza 
Foods and Dean Foods combined is about 35% of the U.S. total.  Suiza 
officials suggest that more concentration will occur, noting that 
concentration is substantially higher than 35% in certain other U.S. food 
processing sectors. Moreover, if Borden's conclusions about economies 
available from use of fluid milk hyperplants are valid, expect substantial 
further consolidation.       
  Concentration in Production of Manufactured Dairy Products in the 
U.S.  Forces similar to those driving concentration in fluid milk processing 
are driving concentration in processing of manufactured dairy products.  
Aggregate statistics, figures on plant sizes and numbers, and trade literature 
provide information--albeit somewhat anecdotal--on this point.  Moreover, 
larger plants are being planned.   
  USDA figures show that the number of U.S. firms producing hard 
manufactured dairy products declined from about 2,061 in 1985 to 1,340 in 
1998 (-35%) while output per plant increased by about 75% during this 
period [14].   Kraft is the largest U.S. producer of branded dairy products (dairy 
sales of U.S.$4.3 billion in 1998), selling cheese under the Kraft, 
Philadephia Brand, Velveeta, Knudsen's, Cracker Barrel and Polly-O brands.  
Kraft's U.S. market shares were as follows in 1999 for the cheese brand 
categories noted in the schedule [18]: 
  
Brand Category        Kraft's Dollar Share 
  Natural Cheese Brands            21% 
  Natural Shredded Cheese Brands              31 
  American Cheese Brands          61 
 
  Anecdotal information for Associated Milk Producers, Inc. (AMPI),  
Leprino Foods, and Dairygold, Inc. reveals certain end results of 
concentration in butter and cheese.  AMPI operates the largest dedicated 
butter plant in the U.S. in New Ulm, Minnesota.  This plant produces about 
45,350 metric tons of packaged butter per year [23].   Dairygold, Inc., a 
cooperative located in the Pacific Northwest, operates a cheese and milk 
powder plant that processes 1,815 metric tons of milk per day. Leprino 
Foods Company, a privately held U.S. processor of mozzarella cheese, 
operates a plant in Roswell, New Mexico that processes 2,360 metric tons  
of milk daily [3].  The company operates cheese plants in Colorado, 
Michigan, New York and that typically process 900 to 1,400 metric tons of  
milk per day.     
  Still larger plants are likely to materialize.  Three new cheese 
processing plants are being built in California by (a) Land O' Lakes, Inc. and 
Mitsui of Japan, (b) another large cooperative, and (c) Leprino Foods.  Land 
O'Lakes and Mitsui claim that they are building the world's largest cheese 
plant [7].  The plant, which will be owned 70% by Land O' Lakes and 30% 
by Mitsui under a joint venture, will produce Cheddar and Mozzarella 
cheese for the U.S. domestic market, whey fractions for global markets, and 
whey fractions for producing dietary and sports drinks.   
The planned production from these three plants will increase 
California's cheese production capacity by up to 40% in five years.  
California dairy industry people believe that California's milk production 
will increase by enough to supply these plants with raw milk.  The rapid 
growth of milk production in California adds credence to such beliefs. 
 
Forces Producing Expanded Milk Production in the Western U.S. 
During the 1990s, the Western States of the U.S. expanded milk 
production rapidly.  California surpassed Wisconsin to become the leading milk producing state in the U.S. in 1993.  Idaho, New Mexico, and Arizona 
also expanded milk production rapidly during the 1990s.  
  Figure 1 showing regional shares of milk production for the U.S. in 
1998 and the percentage change in regional milk production from 1993 to 
1998 provides perspective on the magnitude of the shift in milk production 
to the Western U.S. in the 1990s. The East North Central Region (includes 
Wisconsin) had a 23% share of U.S. milk production in 1998, two 
percentage points lower than in 1993.  The share of milk production in the  
West North Central Region (includes Minnesota) was 13% in 1998, down 
six percentage points from 1993. The Western region (includes California 
and Idaho) had a one third market share of U.S. milk production in 1998, up 
26% from 1993.   For the entire U.S., milk production increased 5% from 
1993 to 1998. 
  
Table 3.  U.S. Regional Shares of Cheese Production in 1998 and Percentage 
       Changes in Regional Cheese Production, 1993 to 1998.*               
_____________________________________________________________ 
Region        % of U.S. Cheese Production  
                in 1998 and % Change from 1993 
_____________________________________________________________ 
East North Central                                      33% 
              +     5 %  
 
West North Central           17% 
              - 1 3 %  
 
W e s t                  3 3 %  
            + 6 9 %  
 
U.S.             100% 
            + 1 5 %  
_____________________________________________________________ 
*Source: USDA [35]. 
  
The figures in Table 3 indicate that cheese--the growth item for the 
U.S. dairy industry--manufacturing is following milk production to the 
Western region of the country. 
  What are the economic forces that have flattened or reduced milk 
production in the traditional dairy areas of Wisconsin and Minnesota and 
increased milk production in the Western U.S.?  In California, Idaho, and certain other Western states, dairy farming has taken on more of the 
characteristics of industrialized agriculture.  Large feedlot style dairy 
farming operations exhibiting scale economies and using specialized labor 
are comon.  Scientific management--especially use of electronic dairy cow 
production records--is employed by a larger percentage of the producers in 
the Western states.  The nature of the operations and management practices 
have produced lower costs and higher milk production per cow in the 
Western states.  The low cost of acquiring and shipping dairy feeds from the 
growing regions of the U.S. Midwest to the Western states in the late 1990s 
also has accelerated the expansion of milk production in the latter states.  
Water shortages and environmental problems--long thought to loom large as 
important constraints on growth of milk production in California--have not 
had the expected impact.   
  The impact of low feed costs and a host of other developments have 
pushed milk production up sharply in the Western U.S. in 1999 relative to 
the Upper Midwest.  For example, milk production in California increased 
by 10% over year-earlier levels in 1999 [40].  In Wisconsin and Minnesota, 
the comparable figures were 1% and 2%, respectively. 
  Wisconsin and Minnesota retain certain advantages in milk 
production.  These include a favorable climate for forage and grain 
production, competitive farmer pay prices for milk, specialization in cheese 
production in Wisconsin, a generally excellent product image for Wisconsin 
cheese, and a favorable location for marketing manufactured dairy 
productions in the Eastern U.S.  Using Porter's terminology, one might 
characterize the advantages of Wisconsin and Minnesota in dairying as those 
associated with a viable industry cluster [29].  The components of the cluster 
include university departments that carry out research and extension 
activities relating to the dairy industry, a pool of experienced people 
employed in dairy processing and marketing firms, trade organizations and 
state departments of agriculture that foster exchange of dairy information, 
and cattle sales organizations that facilitate purchase and sale of replacement 
cattle, cull cows and dairy beef.       
  On the farm production side, the disadvantages of the Upper 
Midwestern dairy industry include relatively low milk production per cow, 
small herd size, slowness to adopt new production technologies, problems 
with forage quality, lack of business management training, and resistance to 
change, all of which can contribute to higher average costs of milk 
production than found in the Western U.S.  In addition, most dairy farmers 
in the Upper Midwest don't have the equity capital needed to expand to the size required to be fully competitive with the more efficient Western dairy 
farmers.      
The Upper Midwestern U.S. dairy industry also faces challenges 
relating to aging processing plants.  New construction of large scale dairy 
processing plants has taken place largely in the Western U.S. to capture 
long-term competitive advantages in that region.  While some remodeling 
and expansion of milk processing plants has occurred in the Upper 
Midwestern U.S., the amount is small compared to that which has occurred 
in the Western region.  Nubern in 1999 described the pressures to modernize 
facing the Upper Midwestern dairy processing sector as follows [28]: 
  
  "Even though market shares for milk and cheese production have 
  declined over time, the dairy industry in the Upper Midwest  
remains competitive mostly due to lower fixed costs associated 
with plants, buildings, and machinery.  In the not too distant 
future, the Upper Midwest will face a crossroads--keep the  
status quo and continue suffering a decline in market share or make 
the necessary investments to remain competitive."   
 
  Upper Midwestern dairy processors are, of course, aware of the 
problem that Nubern described.   Partly out of such concerns, two Upper 
Midwestern-based cooperatives (Land O' Lakes, Inc. and Alto Cooperative 
of Wisconsin) undertook a feasibility study in 2000 to determine whether to 
build a jointly-owned cheese plant in Wisconsin that would be the largest 
cheese plant East of the U.S. Rocky mountains [33].  Whether it will be 
profitable to build such a plant will depend partly on whether Wisconsin's 
milk production--fed by further growth in numbers of a Western-type dairy 
farms in the State--can grow enough to supply the milk needed for such a 
plant.     
  The end result of the interregional competition in dairying involving 
the Upper Midwest and the Western regions of the U.S. is partially 
dependent of international marketing and trade developments.  If, as is now 
the case, the large farms and processing plants in the Western U.S. continue 
to have little incentive to export dairy products, they will battle the 
Midwestern U.S. dairy industry for market share in domestic dairy markets.   
Accompanying the fierce competition in the domestic market, will be 
expanded purchases of manufactured dairy products under the USDA's dairy 
price support program in the early 2000s.  
 Forces Limiting U.S. Dairy Imports and Exports and Expanding 
Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. Dairy Industry 
In the aggregate the U.S. dairy imports and exports are small and 
approximately equal, reflecting the lack of price incentives for either large 
dairy exports or imports.  However, foreign direct investment in the U.S. 
dairy industry is substantial and involves such well-known foreign firms as 
the Kerry Group of Ireland, Glanbia of Ireland, Ireland's Dairy Board, 
Nestle, Unilever, MD Foods of Denmark, the Saputo Group of Canada, 
Lactalis, Parmalot, and the New Zealand Dairy Board.      
  U.S. Dairy Exports and Imports.  U.S. dairy exports consist mainly of 
milk powder, dried whey products, ice cream, and a limited quantity of 
specialty cheeses.  U.S. Nonfat dry milk powder exports, which were 
equivalent to about 22% of production during 1995 to 1999, were made with 
the aid of DEIP export subsidies [36].  In addition, about 24% of U.S. whole 
milk powder--a product not produced  in quantity in the U.S.--also was 
exported with the aid of the USDA's export subsidies during this same 
period. Dried whey, a byproduct of the large U.S. cheese industry, is a 
growth export.  U.S. firms exported this item to more than 10 countries 
during 1999, with about 35% of the product going to Canada and Mexico 
[36].  Cheese exports--including high-valued specialty cheeses--equaled 
about one percent of U.S. cheese production during 1995-99.   Fluid milk is 
costly for U.S. firms to export.  However, Dean Foods has developed a small 
but expanding market in Mexico for fluid milk produced in the firm's Texas 
plants [27]. 
  The U.S. is a leading world importer of cheese. As a result of the 1994 
GATT/WTO agreement, the U.S. agreed to permit within quota cheese 
imports equivalent to about 5% of U.S. consumption.  U.S. cheese imports 
during 1994-99 approached the 5% within quota access figure during 1994-
99 when they averaged the equivalent of 4% to 5% of U.S. cheese 
consumption [36].  These imports consisted substantially of bulk cheese 
imported by the New Zealand Dairy Board through its U.S. subsidiaries, and 
specialty cheeses originating from Europe.  In 2000, the New Zealand Dairy 
Board's U.S. subsidiaries will hold licenses to import nearly 70% of within 
quota U.S. cheese imports [11]. 
  Why are U.S. dairy imports and exports generally so small?  The 
reasons are simple.  There are few price incentives for such economic 
activity.  Reflecting mainly high border protection, U.S. internal prices for 
bulk dairy products are substantially higher than world prices.  For example, 
in 1999 U.S. prices for cheddar cheese, butter, and nonfat dry milk, 
respectively, averaged 62%, 90%, and 76% higher than world prices as measured by the midpoint of fob Northern Europe prices for these items 
[36].  Thus, with the exception of a few products--e.g., specialty cheeses, ice 
cream, and dried whey--U.S. dairy products are not priced competitively in 
world markets.  Similarly, the high border protection and limited within 
quota access to U.S. dairy markets makes it infeasible for firms to sell most 
imported dairy products in the U.S. market.        
  Casein, as noted earlier, represents an exception to the statement about 
the feasibility of importing foreign dairy products.  This item enters the U.S. 
duty free and without quota limits.  Irish firms and the New Zealand Dairy 
Board export substantial quantities of this product to the U.S.  Ultra filtered 
dried (or semi-liquid) skim milk--the so-called total milk protein--also can 
enter the U.S. without a tariff.  If U.S. processors were permitted to use 
casein and ultra filtered skim milk (under revised standards of product 
identity) to produce a full range of cheeses in the U.S., these ingredients 
would find expanded use in the U.S. dairy industry and almost certainly 
would come under closer scrutiny from the import-sensitive domestic dairy 
industry.   
  Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. Dairy Industry.  Foreign direct 
investment in the U.S. dairy industry expanded during the 1980s and 1990s.  
European Union (EU) dairy firms gained incentives to invest in the U.S. and 
other foreign markets partly because of the presence of milk production 
quotas in the EU, which limited expansion opportunities at home.  In 
addition, EU firms sought to expand into the U.S. and other foreign markets 
to introduce processing and marketing innovations that had proven 
successful in the EU. The large, relatively prosperous and homogeneous 
U.S. market had obvious attractions.  These same attractions discourage U.S. 
firms from expanding into foreign dairy markets.  
  The Kerry Group and Glanbia of Ireland both mention the quota effect 
as part of the reason for their decision to enter the U.S. market.  Kerry began 
with casein sales in the U.S. and used this as a springboard for expanding 
operations in the lucrative U.S. food ingredients markets. One of Kerry's 
major U.S. acquisitions was the U.S.$130 million purchase of Beatreme 
Food Ingredients Company in 1988 [39]. Glanbia's subsidiaries have 
extensive milk processing operations in the rapidly growing Idaho milk 
production area.     
  The Saputo Group of Canada has made several acquisitions in the 
U.S., notably the previously mentioned Stella Cheese acquisition.  Saputo 
paid what industry sources claim was a high price (U.S.$405 million) for 
Stella Foods which had annual sales of U.S.$ 750 million in the mid-1990s 
[6].   Saputo apparently was willing to pay the high price because of Stella Food's well-known brands and potential to grow into a strong regional and 
national specialty cheese company. Saputo also acquired Wisconsin-based 
Avonmore Cheese, Inc. and Waterford Food Products, Inc. from Avonmore 
Waterford Group/PLC of Ireland in 1998.  These acquisitions plus additional 
acquisitions in Canada in the late 1990s have given the Saputo Group a 
substantial presence in Italian and other specialty cheeses in the U.S. and 
Canadian markets.  Saputo has announced that it has the financial resources 
to make additional acquisitions.   
  Nestle and Haagen-Dazs entered into a joint venture in 1999 which 
gave them together about 10% of the U.S. super-premium packaged ice 
cream and novelty market [2].  Unilever has a 16% to 20% share of this 
same U.S. market.  
  A host of other foreign firms have acquired U.S. dairy processing and 
marketing operations.  Parmalot (Italy) introduced the firm's extended shelf 
life products to the U.S. and also acquired U.S. plants for producing ice 
cream and conventional fluid milk products in the U.S. market.  MD Foods 
of Denmark produces and markets Havarti cheese from a Wisconsin plant.  
Many of other foreign-based firms process specialty cheeses and other high 
value added dairy products in the U.S. Danone (France) produces and 
markets cultured dairy products in the U.S.      
  Kraft is one of the few large U.S. food firms that has made large direct 
investments in foreign dairy industries.  The firm has manufacturing and 
distribution operations in Australia and Europe.  The firm also exports U.S. 
dairy products into Latin America.  Land O' Lakes has acquired a dairy plant 
in Paslek, Poland.   
  When, if ever, will U.S. firms engage in expanded exporting or 
engage in expanded EU-style direct investments in foreign dairy businesses?  
U.S. firms presently have few price incentives to export bulk dairy products. 
Hence, unless the U.S. market becomes more open to imports and the 
USDA's price support program ends, domestic dairy product prices will 
remain substantially above world dairy product prices and limit incentives of 
U.S. firms to export bulk dairy products.  U.S. firms can be expected to 
expand exports of specialty dairy products modestly since those products 
can be exported despite the high tariffs that exist in many foreign markets.  
U.S. firms will have few incentives to expand foreign direct investment in 
other countries as long as the U.S. market remains more attractive and less 
costly to serve than most others.      
  The disincentives for exporting or foreign direct investment will not 
persist indefinitely in the U.S.  Thomas Suber, Executive Director of the 
U.S. Dairy Export Council (USDEC), characterized the future of the U.S. dairy industry as one where real costs of milk production are declining, 
domestic demand is growing modestly and the role of government is 
declining.  As a result, he claims that "…the processors, cooperatives, 
traders, and farmers who determine USDEC policy face the future with a 
cold realism that either we compete internationally or we will shrink as an  
industry [32]." 
  Mexico represents an attractive market for U.S. dairy exports and 
foreign direct dairy investment.  As a result of the NAFTA, Mexico's dairy 
import tariffs will decline to low levels in the next few years, creating an 
environment that will invite expanded U.S. dairy exports to serve Mexico's 
dairy markets. Success there might foster interest in exports and foreign 
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